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Multiple Realization in Systems Biology 
 
Abstract: Polger and Shapiro (2016) claim that unlike human-made artifacts cases of 
multiple realization in naturally occurring systems are uncommon. Drawing on cases from 
systems biology, I argue that multiple realization in naturally occurring systems is not as 
uncommon as Polger and Shapiro initially thought. The relevant cases, which I draw from 
systems biology, involve generalizable design principles called network motifs which recur 
in different organisms and species and perform specific functions. By examining two 
network motifs, negative autoregulation and feed-forward loops in detail, I show that 
network motifs with entirely different underlying causal structures can perform the same 
function of interest. The article also considers the scope problem of multiple realization, 
namely, are cases of MR in the biological world rare? 
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1. Introduction 
 
Multiple realization (MR) is the thesis that, roughly speaking, a higher-level scientific kind 
can be multiply realized (or is at least multiple realizable) by more basic scientific kinds 
(Shapiro 2000).1 The thesis was initially proposed to describe the relationship between 
psychological and neuroscientific kinds (Putnam 1967; Block and Fodor 1972; Fodor 
1974), but was later extended to fields such as philosophy of biology (Kitcher 1984; Sober 
1999; Koskinen 2017; Fang 2018). For many participants in the debate (e.g., Polger and 
Shapiro 2016), MR is essentially an empirical thesis concerning a particular type of 
phenomenon happening in the real world and, as such, claims for (or against) it must be 
supported by empirical evidence. Philosophical interest in this thesis largely stems from its 
close relation to many important philosophical questions, such as the autonomy of the 
special sciences (e.g., Fodor 1974; Rosenberg 2001), reductionism (e.g., Sober 1999; 
Bickle 2003), functions and functional properties (e.g., Couch 2005; Chirimuuta 2018), 
                                                             
1 The terms multiple realization and multiple realizability are sometimes used loosely or 
interchangeably. As Polger and Shapiro (2018) clarify, the former refers to the fact that 
some property, kind or function is actually multiply realized while the latter refers to the 
possibility that some property, kind or function can be multiply realized. As this paper 
evaluates the extent to which kinds are actually realized, I will be using the term multiple 
realization (or its abbreviation, MR). 
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etc. 
Many attempts have been made to refine, defend and refute the MR thesis (Bechtel 
and Mundale 1999; Clapp 2001; Polger 2002, 2008, 2015; Bickle 2003, 2010; Gillett 2003; 
Couch 2004, 2009; Richardson 2008; Sullivan 2008). However, perhaps the most 
intriguing development in the last two decades owes to Lawrence Shapiro’s body of work 
(2000, 2004, 2008; see also Polger and Shapiro 2016). A central component of this work is 
Shapiro’s causally relevant differences criterion (2000). According to this criterion, two 
cases count as instances of MR only when they contribute causally relevant differences to 
the realization of the same (or similar) property or function.2 This criterion captures the 
heart of the MR thesis and arguably provides a framework in which vague intuitions, 
grounded solely in conceptual possibilities, can give way to detailed analysis of concrete 
scientific evidence. 
Nonetheless, Shapiro’s criterion was somewhat underdeveloped. Based on recent 
advances in the literature (and especially on what Shapiro and Polger have accomplished 
during the last two decades), a well-articulated official recipe for judging cases of MR has 
been put forward (Polger and Shapiro 2016). This recipe has a number of merits, not only 
                                                             
2 Following Polger and Shapiro (2016), I will take a neutral stance towards the relata of 
the realization relationship, should it be properties, kinds, or functions. I will say more 
about kinds and functions in the following sections. 
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because it incorporates the key insight contained in the causally relevant differences 
criterion, but also respects a couple of widely agreed upon aspects of realization. For 
example, the recipe admits that MR involves different taxonomic systems for determining 
the sameness and/or difference of properties or functions; that different taxonomic systems 
may have distinct criteria of sameness and/or difference with respect to 
properties/functions (2016, 62).3 
With this full-fledged recipe in place, many supposed cases of MR, such as pain in 
humans and octopuses, neuroplasticity, compound vs. camera eyes, etc., can be easily 
evaluated and adjudicated. However, there is a curious discontinuity here, as Polger and 
Shapiro arrive at different conclusions when examining cases from artifacts and naturally 
occurring systems. While granting the existence of MR in naturally occurring systems, 
Shapiro and Polger maintain that MR is much more common in artifacts: 
 
                                                             
3 This point constitutes a challenge to Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) objection to the MR 
thesis, because they require in their argument that the MR thesis really holds only when the 
realizer and the realized employ the same grain size in their taxonomies. However, first, it 
is a matter of fact that different sciences usually do not employ the same grain size in their 
taxonomies, and second, as Zerrilli (2017) recently has pointed out, Bechtel and Mundale’s 
request for the sameness of grain size across different taxonomic systems is impossible to 
follow at best and misleading at worst. 
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We turn to these examples [artifacts] because multiple realization is much less 
common in naturally occurring systems than is usually recognized. The conditions 
for the kinds of variation that count as multiple realization are easy to create at a 
workbench or drafting table, but they are relatively rare in nature. (2016, 74) 
 
They arrive at this conclusion by denying several supposed cases of MR, such as 
neuroplasticity, memory, and the conceptual possibility of artificial intelligence. 
The purpose of this essay is to show that MR occurs in the biological world, and more 
often than Polger and Shapiro, along with many other philosophers, envision.4 I defend 
this claim using a detailed analysis of concrete examples drawn from systems biology. 
Systems biology is a thriving new discipline that enjoys both an engineering and biological 
perspective, in which general design principles (called ‘network motifs’) that recur in 
                                                             
4 Koskinen (2017) and Chirimuuta (2018) recently have also argued for the common 
existence of MR in biological systems. Koskinen approaches this issue from the 
perspective of synthetic biology, where scientists not only create novel functional 
realizations that are not true of the actual biological world, but also streamline functional 
realizations that could otherwise come to be true in the actual biological world. Chirimuuta 
highlights the centrality and prevalence of functional thinking in biology, arguing for a 
biologically-grounded conception of multiple realization that does a better job in 
recognizing the importance of functional thinking in biology. 
6 
 
different organisms and species are being discovered. The interdisciplinary nature of this 
new area shows that the gap between artifacts and naturally occurring systems is in fact not 
as large as many would imagine. 
The essay unfolds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by unpacking Polger and 
Shapiro’s official recipe. Section 3 describes two generalizable design principles (i.e., 
network motifs) in systems biology that serve the same function of boosting the response 
time of transcription networks. Section 4 examines the question of whether the two 
network motifs constitute a genuine case of MR in terms of the official recipe. Finally, 
Section 5 argues that MR occurs far more commonly in the biological world than Polger 
and Shapiro give it credit for. 
 
2. Polger and Shapiro’s Official Recipe 
 
To determine when there is a case of MR, Shapiro (2000) suggests a useful causally 
relevant differences (CRD) criterion. According to the CRD criterion: 
 
Multiple realizations count truly as multiple realizations when they differ in causally 
relevant properties—in properties that make a difference to how they contribute to 
the capacity under investigation. (Shapiro 2000, 644; author’s emphasis) 
7 
 
 
The key to this criterion is that, as suggested by Shapiro’s slogan “same but different” 
(Shapiro 2000, 2004, 2008), different realizers must contribute causally relevant 
differences to the realization of the same (or at least similar) property or function. That is, 
multiple realization is a situation wherein causally relevant differences result in sameness 
in the realized property or function. By contrast, if the sameness of the realized property or 
function can be causally traced back to the sameness of the realizers, and if the differences 
can also be causally traced back to the differences of the realizers, then the realizers are not 
genuinely different realizers. Only those cases where differences result in sameness can 
count as cases of multiple realization. A well-known example helps illustrate this point. 
Two waiter’s corkscrews can do the job of removing corks equally well, even though one 
is red and the other is blue. Do these two corkscrews count as different realizers of the 
same function of removing corks? Certainly not, because the difference in color does not 
contribute to how they realize the function of removing corks. How about a slightly 
different scenario where one waiter’s corkscrew is made of aluminum and another is made 
of steel? The answer is still negative, for again the difference in material composition in 
this case does not seem to contribute to how they realize the function of interest.  
One might wonder, then, if there is any way for two corkscrews to be different 
realizers of the same function of removing corks. This time the answer is affirmative. One 
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way discussed by Shapiro (2000) is associated with different mechanical principles 
whereby different types of corkscrews remove corks in different ways. For example, a 
waiter’s corkscrew differs from a winged corkscrew in that they utilize different 
mechanical principles to remove corks, even though they might be of the same color or 
made of the same material.  
However, there remain puzzling cases that the CRD criterion does not seem to 
accommodate so easily. On the face of it, we might think that a difference in material 
composition is not causally relevant to removing corks. But that is not exactly right. For 
instance, a difference in material composition can lead to a difference in rigidity, which in 
turn can lead to a difference between failing and succeeding in removing corks. 
Corkscrews made of plastic, for example, might be too soft to remove any corks. So, it 
seems that the difference in rigidity due to the different material composition is causally 
relevant after all. Therefore, according to the CRD criterion, the realizers that contribute 
causally relevant differences to the realization of a function do in fact constitute different 
realizers. 
To disentangle puzzles of this sort, the CRD criterion needs clarification. First, it is 
important to the criterion that the same property or function is realized in different ways 
(Polger and Shapiro 2016, 67). In terms of this condition, a waiter’s corkscrew that is soft 
will work in the same way as one that is rigid, albeit less efficiently. The waiter’s 
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corkscrews do not, therefore, count as cases of MR. Further, the different efficiency in 
removing corks due to their difference in rigidity is an individual variation rather than a 
difference in kind. Moreover, we must be clear that MR is relational, as opposed to 
absolute and transitive, such that we should specify what exactly is the realizer and what 
exactly is the realized when evaluating putative cases of MR (Polger 2008). For instance, 
with respect to the property of rigidity, corkscrews with different material composition may 
count as cases of MR because they sometimes result in the same rigidity in different ways.5 
In contrast, with respect to removing corks, different material composition cannot result in 
MR since the compositional variations on a given corkscrew design are causally irrelevant 
to the mechanism of cork removal. 
Taking account of these considerations, and integrating the body of work on MR they 
have developed over the last two decades (Shapiro 2004, 2008; Polger and Shapiro 2008; 
Polger 2009; Shapiro and Polger 2012), Polger and Shapiro have proposed an updated 
official recipe for MR (Polger and Shapiro 2016). According to this recipe, two instances 
(or entities, objects, properties, etc.) constitute a case of MR only if they meet the 
following conditions: 
 
                                                             
5 E.g., metals and woods are rigid in different ways, one involving isotropic molecular 
arrangement while another involving anisotropic laminar cellular arrangement. 
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(a) They are of the same kind in a higher taxonomic system or model; 
(b) They are of different kinds in a lower taxonomic system or model; 
(c) The factors that lead the two instances to be differently classified by the lower 
taxonomic system must be among those that lead them to be commonly classified 
by the higher taxonomic system; 
(d) The relevant variation between the two instances, according to the lower 
taxonomic system, must be distinct from the intra-kind variation between the two 
instances according to the higher taxonomic system (adapted from Polger and 
Shapiro 2016, 68).  
 
The two instances are bearers of the functions or functional kinds defined by the special 
sciences such as systems biology, wherein a function typically refers to what 
something—be it an entity, a state, a property, or an object—can do (Polger and Shapiro 
2016, 22).6 Alternatively, the two instances are instantiations of two causal mechanisms or 
principles. Notice that MR involves different taxonomic systems, defined by different 
sciences, explanations, or models (Ibid., 26-32; see also Couch 2004; Polger 2008; 
Richardson 2008). Consequently, the sameness or difference of functions is judged by their 
                                                             
6 Fodor (1974) thinks that special sciences kinds are usually functionally individuated 
kinds, with which Shapiro agrees (2000, 2004, 2016).  
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own taxonomic systems in their own sciences, explanations, or models, respectively. In 
other words, “[…] sameness and difference are understood relative to taxonomies” (Polger 
and Shapiro 2018, 449). Condition (c) says that two instances should be different in the 
way that they realize the same function in different ways, where the different ways can be 
classified by the lower taxonomic system and the same function by the higher one. Finally, 
condition (d) attempts to make the distinction between intra-kind variations and inter-kind 
differences, where inter-kind differences are determined by whether they accomplish a 
function in different ways using the lower taxonomic system. Note that this recipe differs 
from the CRD criterion in one important aspect: it does not require that the factors that lead 
the two instances to be differently or commonly classified (by the lower or higher 
taxonomic system, respectively) be causal. The factors can be causal or non-causal.7 
However, for this essay’s purpose I need only focus on the causal situation.  
With this updated official recipe at hand, we are in a good position to evaluate 
supposed cases of MR. For example, it is not so hard to show that the case of waiter’s 
corkscrews with different rigidity cannot constitute a case of MR, for it simply does not 
                                                             
7 This renders the recipe much broader to perhaps include non-causal forms of MR, e.g., 
compositional MR suggested by Aizawa and Gillett (2011): compositional differences 
generate MR in the way that the compositional differences that matter for the sake of the 
realizer-level classification are also among those responsible for the realized-level 
similarity.  
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satisfy condition (c); namely, it is not the case that the difference in rigidity leads to 
different modes of realization. By contrast, a waiter’s corkscrew and a winged corkscrew 
do count as different ways of realizing the same function. First, suppose there is a special 
science of corkscrews. Such an imagined science might say that the waiter’s and winged 
corkscrews represent two distinct kinds since they employ different mechanical principles 
to do the same thing, i.e., removing corks. So, the second condition is satisfied. Moreover, 
such a science might also say that, in terms of the job these two kinds of corkscrews 
perform, they are better classified as being of the same kind. Note that this imaginary 
science has deployed two taxonomic systems when judging whether the waiter’s and 
winged corkscrews belong to the same kind: one relating to mechanical principles, and the 
other to the common goal they achieve. Hence, the first condition is also met. Furthermore, 
the different mechanical principles embody causally relevant differences that lead the two 
kinds of corkscrews to fulfil the same goal; in other words, to borrow Shapiro’s slogan, it 
is the differences that result in the sameness. The the third condition is thus met. Finally, as 
implied by the fulfilment of the second condition, the differences between the waiter’s and 
winged corkscrews are clearly inter-kind differences, and any differences in how 
efficiently these artifacts achieve the same goal constitute an intra-kind variation. 
Therefore, the last condition is also satisfied. Taken together, we can safely conclude that 
this is a case of MR. 
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3. Design Principles in the Biological World8 
 
Artifacts such as corkscrews and watches are largely uncontroversial. The consensus partly 
arises from the observation that human designers usually intentionally build artifacts that 
comply with different design principles and yet serve the same purpose. There is less 
agreement over whether cases of MR are also common in naturally occurring systems such 
as biological systems, where no intentional designers can be found. Some hold that MR is 
common in naturally occurring systems (Gillett 2003; Sullivan 2008; Aizawa 2009, 2013; 
Fang 2018), whereas others refute (Shapiro 2000, 2004, 2008; Shapiro and Polger 2012; 
Polger and Shapiro 2016).  
However, recent achievements and developments in systems biology have shown that 
the gap between artifacts and biological systems might be not as sharp as many have 
imagined. Despite the astonishing complexity of the biological world, it is possible to find 
                                                             
8 Note that design principles have recently drawn a lot of attention from philosophers 
concerned with systems biology (e.g., Braillard 2010; Levy and Bechtel 2013; Green 2015, 
2017; Brigandt 2018). Even though these authors do not explicitly discuss MR, they all 
highlight that design principles are abstracted away from systems with heterogeneous 
underlying causal details. Namely, their discussions on design principles seem to support 
MR. 
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surprisingly simple design principles that can be applied to a wide variety of biological 
systems, over a whole range of different species.9 More remarkably, some design 
principles with entirely different underlying causal mechanisms can sometimes accomplish 
the same goals, e.g., boosting the response time of transcription networks in response to 
environmental signals.  
Before proceeding, a few words on systems biology are in order. One of the central 
goals of this subdiscipline is to search for generalizable patterns or principles that arise 
from interactions between various constituents (e.g., molecules) of living organisms. 
Importantly, the patterns they search for are those that cannot be discovered by focusing on 
the constituents of living organisms alone (Alberghina and Westerhoff 2005; Alon 2007a). 
The advent of large-scale modeling and experimentation techniques (e.g., computational 
simulation) as well as the ready availability of high throughput data ranging over multiple 
scales/levels, make the searching for these generalizable principles an achievable goal 
(Kitano 2002; O’Malley and Dupré 2005; Boogerd et al. 2007). 
Thanks to the efforts taken during the last two decades, systems biologists have 
started to realize that, within the extremely complicated networks of interactions observed 
                                                             
9 Design principles here do not imply that there are human designers. They are just results 
of natural selection whereby advantageous features were selected and preserved while 
disadvantageous features were simply washed out.  
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in organisms, there seem to be simple building-block patterns that recur in different 
organisms and species. These building-block patterns, called network motifs, refer to 
“Patterns that occur in the real network significantly more often than in randomized 
networks” (Milo et al., 2002; Shen-Orr et al., 2002; Cf. Alon 2007a, 27).10 The reason that 
network motifs appear more often than random networks is due to the selection advantages 
they confer upon their bearers—that is, they must be constantly selected during evolution, 
a point we will revisit later.  
Since one goal of systems biology is to search for generalizable design principles that 
underlie biological systems, it provides ground on which to assess whether the fact of 
attaining the same goals or fulfilling the same functions by different design principles is a 
sound basis for challenging Polger and Shapiro’s position that MR occurs rarely in the 
biological world. The answer to this question, I think, is affirmative. However, to pave the 
way for answering this question, let me first describe two design principles discovered by 
systems biologists.  
 
3.1. Negative autoregulation 
                                                             
10 For example, statistical analysis shows that, for the type of network motif negative 
autoregulation, the difference in occurrence frequency between it and random networks is 
marked by 32 standard deviations, showing a high statistical significance (Alon 2007a, 
30-31). 
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First consider the type of network motif termed negative autoregulation (NAR) in sensory 
transcription networks, in comparison with simple regulation: 
 
  
Figure 1. A comparison of simple regulation and negative autoregulation. The left is 
a simple regulation network while the right a negative autoregulation network. 
Arrows in the figure denote causal interactions such as binding, activation, while ⊣ 
represents repression. This figure comes from Alon (2007a, 30). 
 
The left is a simple regulation network, where a transcription factor 𝐴 binds the promotor 
of gene 𝑋, which activates the expression of gene 𝑋. The transcription factor is a special 
kind of protein that “bind[s] to particular DNA sequences in gene regulatory regions and 
control[s] their transcription” (Latchman 1993, 417). The right side is a NAR network, 
where the gene product of 𝑋 binds a specific site in the promotor of gene 𝑋, which 
represses its own transcription. 𝐾 denotes the activation coefficient, defined as “the 
concentration of 𝑋 needed to repress the promotor activity by 50%” (Alon 2007a, 30). 
The only difference between simple regulation and NAR is an additional link, ⊣, 
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representing the repression of a gene by its own gene products (e.g., proteins). When there 
is such a subtle difference, an interesting scientific question arises: why did nature select 
and preserve this structure rather than simply utilize the simpler regulation also available? 
The answer is that it provides its bearers with some important functions that the simple 
regulation network fails to provide. In fact, studies using mathematically controlled 
comparison have shown that one of the functions it confers on its bearers is boosting the 
response time of the transcriptional network—that is, giving a very rapid initial production 
rate (Savageau 1976; see also Molina et al. 1993; Rosenfeld et al. 2002). The response time 
is defined as “the time to reach halfway between the initial and final levels in a dynamic 
process” (Alon 2007a, 19), which is often expressed as 𝑇1/2. The following figure shows 
the difference in response time between simple regulation and NAR: 
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Figure 2. A comparison of response time between simple regulation (dashed line) 
and NAR under the condition that they arrive at the same steady-state level and have 
the same degradation/dilution rates, 𝛼. 𝑇1/2
(𝑛𝑎𝑟)
 denotes the response time of NAR, 
𝑇1/2
(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒)
 the response time of simple regulation, 𝑋/𝑋𝑠𝑡 the ratio of the level of 
gene product 𝑋 and the level of 𝑋 at its steady state. This figure comes from Alon 
(2007a, 35).  
 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that the response time of NAR is significantly shorter than 
simple regulation. It also can be seen from Figure 2 that, due to the high concentration of 
the gene product 𝑋 rapidly produced within a short time interval and the repression nature 
of the network, the NAR network stops production shortly and quickly reaches its 
sought-after steady state. By contrast, because of the lack of the pulse-like fast initial 
production, the simple regulation network can only gradually and slowly climb onto the 
same steady state. Note that a simple regulation network can also reach a rapid initial 
production rate when equipped with a very strong promoter (or when it’s gene products 
have a high degradation rate), but the cost would be huge since this may incur 
overexpression of the gene product (Rosenfeld et al. 2002, 785; Alon 2007a, 34). 
Insofar as the NAR network is widespread in the biological world, there is a reason 
why it was selected and preserved. One possible explanation is that it conferred great 
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advantages on its bearers, because rapid response time means high efficiency in producing 
gene products and quick response to environmental variations.11 All these obvious 
advantages, as shown by the comparison above, cannot be achieved by the simple 
regulation network. 
Therefore, due to these merits that the NAR network confers upon its bearers, it is not 
surprising that it was selected and preserved over evolutionary time. 
 
3.2. The incoherent type-1 feed-forward loops 
 
The previous section has shown that the NAR network motif serves the function of 
boosting the response time of transcription networks in response to environmental signals. 
If boosting response time turns out to be a good strategy with which organisms can cope 
with environmental variations, then one can reasonably hypothesize that the same strategy 
might be rediscovered by other biological mechanisms over evolutionary time. As a matter 
of fact, the same strategy is also employed by a totally different kind of network motif with 
a distinct causal underpinning: the incoherent type-1 feed-forward loop (I1-FFL hereafter), 
as shown in Figure 3 below (Mangan and Alon 2003; Mangan et al. 2006; Alon 2007a, b). 
                                                             
11 The NAR network has other advantages compared with the simple regulation, for 
example, it can increase robustness to fluctuations in production rate (Alon 2007a, 34-37). 
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For illustrative purposes, a coherent type-1 FFL is also shown below. 
 
                       
  
  
  
       (a)              (b)             (c) 
 
Figure 3. (a) is the coherent FFL, (b) the incoherent FFL and (c) simple regulation. 
Arrows represent activation while ⊣ represents repression. (a) is coherent because 
the sign of the direct path from 𝑋 to Z has the same overall sign as the indirect path 
from 𝑋 through 𝑌 to 𝑍. “The overall sign of a path is given by the multiplication 
of the sign of each arrow on the path (so that two minus signs give an overall plus 
sign)” (Alon 2007a, 47). Hence (b) is incoherent. This figure is adapted from Alon 
(2007a, 47).  
 
Like the NAR motif, the FFL also constitutes a very common type of network in biological 
systems (e.g., in E. coli, yeasts, and many higher organisms including humans) (Milo et al. 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Z 
Y 
X 
Y 
Z 
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2002; Mangan and Alon 2003).12 The I1-FFL network has two transcription factors 𝑋 and 
𝑌, wherein the first transcription factor 𝑋 activates the second 𝑌. Both 𝑋 and 𝑌 bind 
the regulatory region of the target gene 𝑍 and collectively regulate 𝑍’s activity. However, 
𝑋 works as an activator while 𝑌 works as a repressor for 𝑍. Hence, the two paths have 
opposite effects on 𝑍: the direct path activates 𝑍 whereas the indirect represses 𝑍.  
The dynamics of this network are as follows: At the beginning, when there is some 
input signal present, the transcription factor 𝑋 is activated. The activated 𝑋 then binds 
the promotor of gene 𝑍, which leads to the transcription of 𝑋 and the production of some 
gene products. At the same time, 𝑋 also activates 𝑌 when there is some input signal for 
𝑌. After a delay, while the concentration of 𝑌 accumulates and reaches its threshold, it 
starts to repress the production of 𝑍’s products, hence decreasing the activity level of 𝑍. 
All in all, the network brings about a pulse-like shape expression rate of 𝑍, as shown 
below:  
 
                                                             
12 Research shows that the FFL’s occurrence frequency is higher than random networks 
with the same number of nodes and edges by more than 30 standard deviations, indicating 
a very high statistical significance.  
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Figure 4. A pulse-like shape expression rate of 𝑍. Also shown is the comparison of 
the response time of the I1-FFL with simple regulation. This figure comes from 
Alon (2007a, 61). 
 
Figure 4 shows that the I1-FFL has a significantly shorter response time compared with 
simple regulation. The response time of the I1-FFL is associated with the repression factor 
F, representing the strength of the repression effect of 𝑌 on 𝑍 (Alon 2007a, 62). Hence, 
the greater the repression factor F, the stronger the repression effect of 𝑌 on 𝑍. F is also 
inversely proportional to the response time—that is, the greater the repression factor F, the 
shorter the response time.13 Therefore, “the stronger the effect of 𝑌 in repressing 
production of 𝑍, the faster the performance of the I1-FFL compared to an equivalent 
                                                             
13 For detailed calculations of the response time, see Alon (2007a, 61-62). 
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simple-regulation circuit 𝑋→ 𝑌 made to reach the same steady-state level of 𝑍” (Ibid., 
62).  
Also, an evolutionary story can be told about why the I1-FFL was selected and 
preserved over evolutionary time. The explanation here is identical to that given for 
negative autoregulation: the I1-FFL conferred great selection advantages on its bearers 
because a quick initial production rate means high production efficiency and rapid 
response to environmental variations.14  
 
4. Are These Network Motifs Cases of MR? 
 
Having set the stage, it is time to answer the key question of this essay: whether the 
different design principles fulfilling the same function offer good reasons to challenge 
Polger and Shapiro’s position that MR occurs rarely in the biological world. This question 
will be answered in two steps. This section will address the question of whether the 
network motifs described in the last section constitute a case of MR, and Section 5 will 
answer the question of whether MR occurs as rarely as Polger and Shapiro thought. 
At a first approximation, the NAR and I1-FFL networks constitute a case of MR. 
                                                             
14 In addition to boosting the response time, the I1-FFL can also serve as a pulse generator 
(Alon 2007a, 57-62). 
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They are two different designs with entirely different causal underpinnings, but which 
realize the same function of boosting the response time of transcription networks. 
Moreover, the differences between the two designs are causally relevant because it is these 
different causal underpinnings that contribute to the realization of the same function. 
We must not, however, reach our conclusion too hastily. Instead, let us examine this 
case more carefully using Polger and Shapiro’s official recipe. To begin with, we should be 
able to honor the notion of definite taxonomic systems in systems biology. The job of a 
taxonomic system in this context would be to classify the various networks found in living 
organisms into different kinds, where these kinds exhibit distinctive causal structures that 
recur sufficiently frequently and are associated with distinct system dynamics. Moreover, 
in order to be classified as kinds, they must show some degree of modularity, meaning that 
they can work appreciably well under conditions in which they are detached from their 
initial interaction networks in the cell they are embedded in as components. The condition 
of modularity ensures their (at least partial) independence, separability, and identity as 
functional units.  
It turns out that the NAR and I1-FFL networks (and many other kinds of networks 
such as the single-input network, the multi-output feed-forward loop, the dense 
overlapping regulon, etc.) satisfy all these conditions for being different kinds, since each 
has its own distinctive causal structure (recall the causal graphs depicted in Section 3), 
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recurs sufficiently commonly compared with random networks, and shows some degree of 
modularity. Hence, they can be classified as different kinds in this taxonomic system. In 
practice, systems biologists do understand the two network motifs—or design principles, 
more broadly—as different kinds because their distinct underlying causal 
mechanisms/structures are associated with heterogeneous system dynamics (see, e.g., 
Kitano 2002; Kollmann et al. 2005; Alon 2007a; Novák and Tyson 2008). Thus, the second 
condition of Polger and Shapiro’s recipe is satisfied. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether there is another taxonomic system in systems 
biology that classifies the NAR and I1-FFL networks as members of the same kind. 
Unfortunately, it seems that systems biology does not explicitly provide such a 
classificatory tool. This is understandable: systems biology is not concerned with whether 
there are cases of MR, and thus is not concerned, in turn, with whether we can find 
different taxonomic systems for differentiating realized properties and functions from their 
realizers. However, this does not mean that we philosophers cannot detect (or at least infer) 
from the practice of systems biologists that there is such a taxonomic system. It seems that 
systems biologists have in mind a level of description associated with the functions that 
organisms fulfil; let us call it the functional level. At the functional level, the primary 
concern is with what a network motif can actually do and, furthermore, whether the job 
accomplished by a motif can also be done by other motifs. Interestingly, systems biologists 
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such as Uri Alon are clearly guided by these sorts of questions in their research. Alon 
deliberately groups three different types of motifs together in terms of their common 
function of boosting the response time of transcription networks;15 as he says that “We 
have by now seen three different ways to speed the response time of transcription networks” 
(Alon 2007a, 64). Therefore, we can say that the NAR and I1-FFL networks are of the 
same kind in a different taxonomic system, a taxonomic system defined by the function 
different motifs can accomplish. This meets the first condition of Polger and Shapiro’s 
recipe.16 
                                                             
15 A third way to achieve this is via simple regulation not discussed in this essay. For 
relevant discussion see Alon (2007a, 18-22). 
16 One might be cautious about reading too much into this one source. However, Alon’s 
book (2007a) is not only his own work on the issue but also summarizes the work 
conducted by a number of scientists from his group, e.g., Milo et al. (2002), Rosenfeld et al. 
(2002), Shen-Orr et al. (2002), Mangan et al. (2003), Mangan et al. (2006), etc. 
Furthermore, there are many other research groups, in addition to Alon’s group, that are 
also engaged in exploring and identifying the various common functions linked with 
specific motifs. For example, Camas et al. (2006) and Zabet (2011) are concerned with 
negative autoregulation’s function of boosting the response time of transcriptional 
networks, while Wall et al. (2005) and Kim et al. (2008) are concerned with the I1-FFL’s 
function of boosting the response time. Singh and Hespanha (2009) show that negative 
autoregulation can serve the function of noise suppression, while Ghosh et al. (2005) show 
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Now consider whether the network motifs satisfy the third condition. Recall that the 
third condition requires that the factors that lead the two instances (e.g., NAR and I1-FFLs) 
to be differently classified by a lower taxonomic system must be among those that lead 
them to be commonly classified by a higher taxonomic system. Let us first specify the very 
factors that lead NAR and I1-FFLs to be differently classified. As I said above, these 
factors are related to the two distinct causal underpinnings exemplified by the two network 
motifs. To be sure, these are totally different causal structures, representing two separate 
causal scenarios. The situation here is analogous to the corkscrew case, wherein the 
waiter’s and winged corkscrews represent two separate mechanical principles—they 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
that the type-1 coherent FFL can serve the same function. Becskei and Serrano (2000) 
show that negative autoregulation in gene circuits can produce stability, whereas Doncic 
and Skotheim (2013) show that the stability of some cellular states can result from 
coherent feedforward regulation. Unlike Alon’s group, these groups do not explicitly put 
different motifs together in terms of their common functions. However, their constant and 
unified use of the common function terms, e.g., ‘boosting/speeding up the response time’, 
‘noise suppression/reduction’ and ‘stability’, and their act of attributing the same functions 
to the distinct motifs, clearly indicate that they have an implicit functional classification 
system in their mind. In other words, their practice presupposes that there is such a 
functional classification system. I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this 
concern.  
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involve two different techniques, designs, or causal stories with respect to removing corks.  
Having said this, the next question is whether these factors are also among those that 
lead the two motifs to be classified as being of the same kind. The key here, according to 
Polger and Shapiro, is to show that these factors constitute the causally relevant elements 
with respect to realizing each motif’s function. Recall that in the corkscrew example, 
properties such as color, size, material composition, rigidity, etc., do not count as causally 
relevant factors with respect to removing corks, while properties such as mechanical 
principles do count as causally relevant. The analogy between the corkscrew case and the 
motif case continues. In our motif case, we can also say that properties such as material 
composition do not concern us, but properties such as how they are causally operating or 
how components are causally connected do concern us. That is, the causal properties 
exemplified in each motif are among those that lead each motif to do what it does. They 
are causally relevant to what the motif can do. Given that the two causal structures end up 
realizing the same function, it is reasonable to conclude that these causal properties 
embedded in the two causal structures are among those that lead the two motifs to be 
classified as being of the same kind. Therefore, to use Shapiro’s slogan again, it is the 
differences that result in the sameness. 
It is therefore possible to turn Polger and Shapiro’s argument against them. Their 
original intention in using the corkscrew example was to dismiss the prevalence of MR in 
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the biological world, while at the same time admitting its common existence in artifacts. 
Yet, we have seen from the analogy made above that what they say about corkscrews is 
equally true of motifs. If the corkscrews achieve the same function through causally 
relevant but distinct ways, then there is no reason to deny that the motifs also achieve the 
same function through causally relevant but different ways. 
Finally, consider Polger and Shapiro’s fourth condition. This condition requires that 
the relevant differences between the NAR and I1-FFL networks according to the lower 
taxonomic system must be distinct from the intra-kind variations between them according 
to the higher taxonomic system. No doubt, the two causal scenarios underlying the two 
motifs constitute two distinct kinds, as demonstrated above. So, the first half of the fourth 
condition is satisfied. How about the second half? I think it is also clear that there exist 
intra-kind variations between the motifs, as in the case of the corkscrews, that differ with 
respect to their efficiency in removing corks. These intra-kind variations can be easily seen 
in, as well as predicted from, the two motifs’ distinct underlying structures. For instance, 
the NAR motif’s function of boosting the response time is due to its employment of a 
strong promotor, while the I1-FFLs’ execution of the same job owes to the repression 
factor F, determined by both the maximal and basal activity of the promotor in question 
(Alon 2007, 61-62). These differences in underlying setups entail that the two motifs are 
sensitive to different inner molecular milieus (e.g., protein levels), differences in chemical 
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bonds, changes of external signals, etc. (even the members within a single type of motif 
can show variations). In other words, the intra-kind variations between the two motifs are 
something to be expected. Hence, the second half of the fourth condition is also met. 
All in all, our motif case satisfies all the conditions of Polger and Shapiro’s recipe, 
leading us to the conclusion that the NAR and I1-FFL motifs constitute a genuine case of 
MR.  
 
5. Are Cases of MR Rare?17 
 
One might be suspicious of the scope of my conclusion, insisting that MR might exist only 
in a couple of special cases in the biological world. Polger and Shapiro say that “[…] on 
the best evidence, cases of multiple realization are more like an exception than a rule” 
(2018, 448). This is too hasty if we take seriously the similarity between artifacts and the 
                                                             
17 Note that Robert Batterman (2000, 2014) also argues for the generality of MR, though 
he focuses on cases in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics and makes appeal to 
universal (i.e., common) behaviors that different systems with heterogeneous underlying 
mechanisms can exhibit. Also note that, although this essay concentrates on examples 
drawn from systems biology to support the generality of MR, other authors have discussed 
a wide variety of examples from, e.g., cognitive science (Wilson and Craver 2006; Walter 
and Eronen 2014), physics, biology and even social sciences (Ellis 2008; 2011).  
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previously overlooked naturally occurring systems, but the opposing case has not been 
made yet either. Therefore, we had better provide other reasons for thinking that MR is not 
uncommon in the biological world. 
First though, we should be clear about how to proceed. Does ‘not-uncommon’ refer to 
the absolute number of instances of MR in the biological world? Obviously not, for if 
‘not-uncommon’ is understood in this way, then it seems MR comes too cheap—if this is 
the relevant sense, the astronomic number of bacteria such as E. coli instantiating NAR and 
FFLs has already demonstrated that MR is certainly not uncommon. If ‘not-uncommon’ 
does not refer to the number of instances, then how about the number of species that 
instantiate NAR and FFLs? Evidence of this kind is more promising, for it is able to 
directly reveal how general the phenomenon is. Happily, systems biologists have shown 
that many species, such as E. coli, yeasts, and many other higher organisms including 
humans, instantiate network motifs such as NAR and FFLs (Milo et al. 2002; Mangan and 
Alon 2003). Moreover, the same network motifs accomplishing important functions can be 
rediscovered in many different species over long time-scales due to convergent evolution 
(Conant and Wagner 2003; Babu et al. 2004).18  
                                                             
18 It is unclear whether network motifs such as NAR and FFLs, which perform the same 
function, are results of convergent evolution. Though it does seem clear that the same 
motifs rediscovered in different species are the outcome of convergent evolution (Conant 
and Wagner 2003; Babu et al. 2004). Also note that whether a case produced by convergent 
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Given this sort of evidence, we may conclude that MR is not rare (in the relevant 
sense) in the biological world. Also, given that systems biology is a relatively young 
discipline and that searching for generalizable design principles is its ongoing mission, we 
may expect to find more species that instantiate NAR and FFLs to be discovered by 
systems biologists in the near future. Even so, however, this is only one type of 
evidence—evidence linked with a specific pair of network motifs (i.e., NAR and FFLs) 
and with only one particular function performed by them. Ideally, we should look to a 
wider variety of evidence.  
First though, a minor point. To be clear, it is not the case that there are only two kinds 
of motifs that perform the function of boosting the response time of transcription networks. 
Recall that in Section 3 I mentioned that a simple regulation network can also boost its 
response time with a very strong promoter or a high degradation rate of the gene product, 
even though this may generate overexpression of the gene product. Perhaps many other 
motifs can be found that fulfil the same function. 
Second, and more importantly, there are indeed other substantial types of evidence, 
such as noise suppression,19 stability,20 and robust patterning in development.21 But for 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
evolution counts as a case of MR is an empirical question subject to careful empirical 
investigation. For discussion of MR related to convergence, see Block and Fodor (1972), 
Couch (2005, 2018), Polger and Shapiro (2016, Chapter 7). 
19 Ghosh et al. (2005) show that noise suppression can be fulfilled by the type-1 coherent 
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the sake of brevity, let us focus on robust patterning. During an organism’s development, 
the fertilized single cell must follow different paths in a spatially fine-tuned fashion in 
order to differentiate into distinct tissues of the organism. Such a sequential process during 
development is called patterning. How the fertilized single cell can form such a precise 
spatial pattern depends on a sort of positional information, which is conveyed by 
morphogen gradients.22 The morphogen that is produced and diffused forms a field, and 
the cells in this field are able to recognize the morphogen via a receptor on the surface of 
the cells. The fate of a cell depends on which set of genes is expressed in that cell, while 
which set of genes is expressed in turn hinges on the concentration of morphogen produced 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
FFL while Singh and Hespanha (2009) show that it can be fulfilled by negative 
autoregulation.  
20 Becskei and Serrano (2000) show that stability can be realized by negative 
autoregulation whereas Doncic and Skotheim (2013) show that it can be realized by 
coherent feedforward regulation. 
21 Note that robust patterning in development is a special type of biological robustness, 
which contains many broader categories of mechanisms that realize the property of 
robustness, e.g., “system control, alternative (or fail-safe) mechanisms, modularity and 
decoupling” (Kitano 2004, 827; see also Kitano 2007). 
22 “Morphogens are diffusible signaling molecules that pattern cellular fields by setting up 
differential gene expression in a concentration-dependent manner” (Arias 2003, 321). 
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in that cell’s environment. At this point, one might reasonably infer that the fate of a cell 
must be very sensitive to the concentration of morphogen. Nevertheless, biologists have 
shown that the patterning process is remarkably robust with respect to a whole range of 
fluctuations and noises including the concentration of morphogen (Eldar et al. 2002, 2004; 
Moreno-Risueno and Benfey 2011; Morishita and Hironaka 2013).  
Technical details aside, what we are interested in here is the question of whether 
organisms have found different ways (i.e., mechanisms with which) to achieve the function 
of robust patterning during development. It turns out that robust patterning can be achieved 
by two different modes of self-enhanced degradation, where self-enhanced degradation is 
“a feedback mechanism that makes the degradation rate of 𝑀 [morphogen] increase with 
the concentration of 𝑀” (Alon 2007a, 164). More specifically, systems biologists have 
discovered two feedback loops (i.e., network motifs) in heterogeneous developmental 
processes that play the key part in the functioning of robust patterning (for details of robust 
patterning via self-enhanced degradation, see Eldar et al. (2002, 2003, 2004)), as shown 
below:23 
 
                                                             
23 Note that, in addition to self-enhanced degradation, there are other mechanisms found to 
be responsible for robust patterning, e.g., serial transcytosis, pre-steady-state patterning, 
cell rearrangement, etc. For a survey of these mechanisms, see Wolpert (2011). 
35 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
            (a)                       (b) 
Figure 5. Two network motifs: (a) self-enhanced degradation via 
double-enhancement; (b) self-enhanced degradation via double-inhibiting. This 
figure comes from Alon (2007a, 166). 
 
In motif (a) morphogen 𝑀 binds receptor 𝑅 and enhances its production. Then, 𝑅 
increases the rate at which 𝑀 is consumed and thus degraded by the cells. In (b) 𝑀 
represses 𝑅, and then 𝑅 inhibits a protease that degrades 𝑀, thus inhibiting 𝑀’s 
degradation. In both cases 𝑀’s degradation rate is augmented by itself. A real example of 
the first motif involves the morphogen ‘Hedgehog’ and its receptor ‘Patched’ that are 
present in the robust patterning process of fruit flies and many other species; a real 
example of the second involves the morphogen ‘Wingless’ and its receptor ‘Frizzled’ that 
are also present in the robust patterning process of fruit flies (Alon 2007a, 166). 
 The two motifs constitute two different ways of realizing the same function of robust 
Degradation 𝑀 
𝑅 
𝑀 Degradation 
𝑅 
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patterning because they involve two different causal mechanisms. The first is a 
double-enhancement mechanism wherein one element 𝑋 enhances another element 𝑌, 
which in turn enhances still another element 𝑍. The overall effect of this mechanism is 
reinforced enhancement. The second is a double-inhibiting mechanism where 𝑋 inhibits 
𝑌 which in turn inhibits 𝑍. The overall effect of this mechanism, however, is also 
reinforced enhancement. Hence, the effects are the same, though the ways they arrive at 
them are different. Clearly, this counts as a case of MR if we follow Polger and Shapiro’s 
recipe. 
We thus have found an additional and independent type of evidence supporting MR. 
This new line of evidence involves a different pair of motifs (i.e., double-enhancement vs. 
double-inhibiting) and a different function (i.e., robust patterning in development). Also, 
the evidence here involves a range of species including fruit flies, among many others.  
Perhaps other lines of evidence can be found too. Nevertheless, the different types of 
evidence presented in this essay, plus the diversity of species instantiating the motifs and 
performing their associated functions in each type of evidence, have already demonstrated 
that MR occurs far more frequently than Polger and Shapiro originally imagined. So, even 
though we do not know yet if MR is a rule in the biological kingdom, we can at least rest 
assured that it is certainly not an exception. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
I have shown that MR is not as uncommon in the biological world as many philosophers 
believe, in the sense that evidence of different types of MR, ranging over several different 
species, can be easily found. The NAR and I1-FFL motifs are one type in point, robust 
patterning in development is another. All in all, systems biology provides us the means 
with which to discover different design principles that fulfil the same biological functions 
of interest. Even though the cases I have canvassed here are limited in scope and varied in 
kind, they at least point to a new direction and serve as a starting point for further 
investigation. 
The more general moral we obtain from these cases is that we should always 
appreciate the open-ended nature of the biological world. If it is common that biological 
systems converge into the same underlying structure to perform a function of interest, then 
there is no a priori reason to exclude the possibility that it is also common for biological 
systems to diverge into different underlying structures that perform the same function of 
interest. At the end of the day, of course, it is an empirical question if biological systems 
have really diverged into different underlying structures that perform the same function, 
and—in agreement with Polger and Shapiro—any claim for it must be subject to rigorous 
empirical inspection. But if what this essay has shown is right, we should at least be more 
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open to such cases, and question the assertion that MR is a rare phenomenon in the natural 
world. 
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